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ASKING TOO MUCH: THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S ERRONEOUS
REVIEW OF SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY DETERMINATIONS
by
Stephen E. Smith
Disability determinations made by the Social Security Administration’s administrative law judges are subject to judicial review by Article III courts. By
statute, these courts apply the “substantial evidence” standard of review on
appeal from the agency. The substantial evidence standard is a forgiving one
that defers to the findings of the agency. But the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has modified this standard. It now reviews certain categories of SSA findings not only for substantial evidence, but for support by “clear and convincing
reasons.” This heightened standard of review is facially at odds with the statutorily mandated substantial evidence standard. It also undercuts the principle
of deference given to the initial factfinder by the substantial evidence standard
of review.
Introduction ........................................................................................................ 1
I.
The Ninth Circuit’s Review of Social Security Disability
Determinations......................................................................................... 3
II.
Standards of Review, Institutional Competence, and Judicial
Economy .................................................................................................. 8
III.
The Ninth Circuit Should Discard Its Mode of Credibility Review ........ 11
INTRODUCTION
The Ninth Circuit has created a standard of review for certain portions of Social Security Administration disability determinations that is at odds with both the
applicable statute and principles of institutional deference. As an outlier among the
circuits, it requires that Social Security Administration (“SSA”) decision makers provide “clear and convincing reasons” for certain findings.1 This is contrary to the

*

Associate Clinical Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law. Former attorneyadvisor to the U.S. Department of Labor’s Office of Administrative Law Judges. I am grateful for
the attention given to this Essay by the members of the Lewis & Clark Law Review.
1
Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1015 (9th Cir. 2014). A Note written on this topic has
asserted that “[a]t present, the case law has settled on the highest level of proof possible for the

1
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lenient “substantial evidence” standard that is generally applied to administrative
adjudications.2
Like so much of the law, standards of review—the tools appellate bodies apply
to determine what degree of deference they should give to the lower court rulings
being appealed—are expressed in imprecise phrases. We are familiar with legal tests
that ask triers of fact to determine what a “reasonable person” would do or to make
a distinction between “recklessness” and “knowledge.” We may not be sure where
lines are drawn, but we have a sense of how they should affect the work of the court.
The indistinct effect of verbal legal rules is especially pertinent to the application of appellate standards of review. How can we tell when a trial judge has committed an error that amounts to an “abuse of discretion”? When is a factual determination “clearly erroneous”? These are questions that seem to ask for
measurements, but do not provide instruments to measure them.
Standards of judicial review of lower court and agency rulings come in many
flavors.3 They differ primarily in terms of the degree of deference the reviewing court
is expected to accord the underlying decisionmaker’s ruling.4 Should the earlier ruling be given no weight, with the underlying material reviewed as if the earlier decision never happened? Such a standard is non-deferential de novo review.5 Should
the lower court’s decision instead be considered more-or-less final as to the matter
with review for only gross errors? This may arise under a deferential standard, like
the clearly erroneous or abuse of discretion standards.6 A deferential standard, a fortiori, should be less rigorous and lead to fewer reversals. A less deferential standard,
on the other hand, should take a closer look at the underlying decision and lead to
more reversals. The standard should have an effect on the process and the outcome.
It should matter; it should be taken seriously.

rejection of claimant testimony, ‘clear and convincing’ reasons.” Nora Coon, Honest or Histrionic?
Credibility Evaluation in Judicial Review of Social Security Disability Decisions, 23 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 161, 166–67 (2015) (emphasis added). But this case law is limited to the
Ninth Circuit. Id. at 166. The Note’s thesis is that the “clear and convincing reasons” standard is
preferable as a matter of policy. See id. at 190. It does not address the tension between that
standard and the “substantial evidence” standard.
2
T-Mobile S., LLC v. City of Roswell, 574 U.S. 293, 301 (2015) (“The statutory phrase
‘substantial evidence’ is a ‘term of art’ in administrative law that describes how ‘an administrative
record is to be judged by a reviewing court.’” (quoting United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373
U.S. 709, 715 (1963))).
3
See, e.g., Arellano Hernandez v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied
sub nom, Hernandez v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 2180 (2017) (invoking, variously, de novo, clearly
erroneous, and substantial evidence standards of review).
4
See, e.g., Morales v. Yeutter, 952 F.2d 954, 957 (7th Cir. 1991) (identifying a “deference
spectrum” occupied by “the different verbal standards of review”).
5
See infra notes 53–54 and accompanying text.
6
See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
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Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit’s addition of a demanding “clear and convincing reasons” component to the forgiving “substantial evidence” standard generally
applicable to SSA determinations deserves scrutiny. This Essay will first describe the
Ninth Circuit’s approach to its review of SSA disability determinations. It will then
explain how the Ninth Circuit’s treatment of SSA administrative law judge (“ALJ”)
determinations of disability claimant credibility is at odds with the principles underlying the choice of a standard of review.
I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S REVIEW OF SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY
DETERMINATIONS
It is unremarkable to note that judicial review of SSA disability determinations
is performed under the “substantial evidence” standard.7 More remarkable is the
Ninth Circuit’s gloss on this standard requiring the SSA to support certain findings
with “clear and convincing reasons.”8 A universally-applied deferential standard has
been altered in the Ninth Circuit to reduce deference to agency factfinders and to
impose stringent demands upon them.9 This is an unusual doctrinal development,
at odds with both statute and the principles of judicial review.
The Social Security disability system has been called one of “the modern administrative state’s two largest decision systems.”10 Appeals of Social Security disability cases take up a substantial part of the dockets of the United States District
Courts.11
The SSA decides disability cases under its Supplemental Security Income
(“SSI”) and Social Security Disability Insurance (“SSDI”) programs.12 Under both

7

E.g., Wellington v. Berryhill, 878 F.3d 867, 871 (9th Cir. 2017) (“We will affirm the
Commissioner’s decision unless it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on a legal
error.”).
8
See, e.g., Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014–15 (9th Cir. 2014).
9
See Moore v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 278 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The clear
and convincing standard is the most demanding required in Social Security cases.”).
10
Paul R. Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of Review Standards, 44 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 679, 703 (2002). The other is “Freedom of Information (FOIA) requests certified by the
Department of Justice (DOJ).” Id.
11
See, e.g., THE NINTH CIRCUIT, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT 54 (2018),
https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/judicial_council/publications/AnnualReport2018.pdf (“Among
matters involving the government, social security cases were most numerous, 4,055, or 51.2
percent of the total U.S. civil cases in [District Courts in] the Ninth Circuit.”).
12
See, e.g., Santiago v. Massanari, No. 00 Civ.3847 GEL., 2001 WL 1946240, at *6 n.7
(S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2001) (“Regulations regarding SSDI and SSI benefits have been promulgated
by the Commissioner under two distinct Parts of Title 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
SSDI benefits are dealt with in 20 C.F.R. Part 404 (2001), and SSI benefits are dealt with in 20
C.F.R. Part 416 (2001). These two Parts are extremely similar. Both parties to this action, as well
as Second Circuit Social Security case law, regularly treat the two sets of regulations as

Smith (Do Not Delete)

4

3/18/2020 9:46 AM

LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:2

titles, a determination is made that a claimant suffers from a disability.13 SSA disability determinations under both titles are subject to judicial review, first in the
United States District Courts, then in the Courts of Appeal.14 By statute, Article III
courts determine only whether SSA findings are supported by “substantial evidence.”15 The same standard applies to administrative agency determinations, generally, by the Administrative Procedure Act.16 This standard of review places primary decisional responsibility not with a reviewing court, but with the agency.17
Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance, . . . that which ‘a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.’”18 The substantial evidence standard is widely acknowledged to be a
deferential one.19 The Ninth Circuit itself has frequently acknowledged the deferential nature of substantial evidence review.20 In explaining the effect of this standard, it has noted that “[i]f evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”21
This deference extends to many factual determinations. In administrative adjudications, the ALJ is supposed to have the primary responsibility for determining
interchangeable. For purposes of this opinion, this Court will also treat 20 C.F.R. Parts 404 and
416 (2001) as functionally identical, with occasional differences indicated as they arise.”).
13
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.315 (2019); id. § 416.202.
14
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (district courts); 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (courts of appeal).
15
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact,
if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.”); see also Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d
871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the decision of the commissioner must be affirmed if it is
supported by substantial evidence and if the commissioner applied the correct legal standards).
The substantial evidence standard appears to have been adopted out of a fear that some agencies
would arrive at decisions based on no evidence at all. Administrative Procedure Act, Proceedings
in the House of Representatives, May 24 and 25, 1946 and Proceedings in the Senate of the United
States, March 12 and May 27, 1946, at 365, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/jmd/
legacy/2013/11/19/proceedings-05-1946.pdf (contrasting decisions based on substantial evidence
with those based on “surmise or suspicion or untenable inference”).
16
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2012); see also Kappos v. Hyatt, 566 U.S. 431, 435 (2012) (agency
factual findings are reviewed under the substantial evidence standard).
17
CHARLES H. KOCH, JR. & RICHARD MURPHY, 3 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE §
9:24 (3d ed. 2019) (noting that the substantial evidence standard “rests the power of decision in
the agency”).
18
See NLRB v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 48, 345 F.3d 1049, 1053–54 (9th Cir.
2003) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
19
E.g., Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 652 F.3d 646, 648 (6th Cir. 2011); Rossello ex rel.
Rossello v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 1181, 1185 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
20
See Monjaraz-Munoz v. INS, 327 F.3d 892, 895 (9th Cir.), amended by 339 F.3d 1012
(9th Cir. 2003) (noting that the standard is “extremely deferential” and that a reviewing court
must uphold the agency’s findings “unless the evidence presented would compel a reasonable
factfinder to reach a contrary result.” (emphasis omitted)).
21
Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. FERC, 545 F.3d 1207, 1212 (9th Cir. 2008).

Smith_Ready_to_Publish (Do Not Delete)

2020]

DISABILITY DETERMINATIONS

3/18/2020 9:46 AM

5

credibility, for resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and for resolving ambiguities in the evidence.22
The Ninth Circuit has spoken from both sides of its mouth on the degree to
which it will defer to agency credibility determinations. On one hand, it has
acknowledged its duty to defer to credibility determinations made by agency hearing
officers.23 This deference has been described as requiring that credibility determinations must be upheld unless they are “inherently incredible or patently unreasonable.”24 On the other hand, it has said that the agency hearing officer must give a
“specific, cogent reason” for adverse credibility findings.25 This requirement of detail is, on its face, less deferential than a “patently unreasonable” standard would
suggest.
The Ninth Circuit has gone even further towards non-deference in certain aspects of SSA disability determination. It has, in some instances, required “clear and
convincing reasons” to support ALJ findings. It first required “clear and convincing
reasons” to overcome uncontroverted opinions of treating physicians. The first use
of this requirement appears in Day v. Weinberger.26 Day cites two other cases for
support of this requirement, one in the Ninth Circuit27 and the other in the Seventh.28 Neither of the cited cases include the phrase “clear and convincing” but instead use the “substantial evidence” language. Nonetheless, despite the lack of textual support, the new gloss on the standard took hold and remains in use in this
context.29
Subsequently, in 1984, the Ninth Circuit applied this standard to claimant
credibility findings.30 Without supporting citation, in what seems to be an offhand
remark in a case otherwise reviewing the matter for substantial evidence, the court
wrote that “[n]o clear and convincing reasons were provided by the ALJ for his rejection of the testimony of Gallant regarding his constant and persistent back

22

Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001); cf. Glasser v. United States,
315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942) (“It is not for us to weigh the evidence or to determine the credibility of
witnesses. The verdict of a jury must be sustained if there is substantial evidence, taking the view
most favorable to the Government, to support it.”).
23
See Mendoza Manimbao v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 2003).
24
Retlaw Broad. Co. v. NLRB, 53 F.3d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Local 512,
Warehouse & Office Workers’ Union v. NLRB, 795 F.2d 705, 712 (9th Cir. 1986)) (applying
substantial evidence standard in National Labor Relations Act case).
25
E.g., Mendoza Manimbao, 329 F.3d at 658; Gui v. INS, 280 F.3d 1217, 1225 (9th Cir.
2002).
26
Day v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir. 1975).
27
White Glove Bldg. Maint., Inc. v. Brennan, 518 F.2d 1271, 1273 (9th Cir. 1975).
28
Hassler v. Weinberger, 502 F.2d 172, 174 (7th Cir. 1974).
29
See Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 680 (9th Cir. 1993); Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d
1391, 1396 (9th Cir. 1991).
30
Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1455 (9th Cir. 1984).
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pain.”31 The requirement of “clear and convincing reasons” to reject claimant testimony has subsequently extended beyond testimony regarding pain, applying as well
to other medical symptoms.32 The court has hewed to this standard ever since in
cases involving claimant testimony.33
A Westlaw search of the terms “social security,” “disability,” and “clear and
convincing” in its United States Courts of Appeals database turns up 898 entries.34
Listed in terms of relevance, the first 100 results were cases issued by the Ninth
Circuit.35 This suggests that no other circuit applies a “clear and convincing” standard to any portion of its review of SSA findings. I take this as evidence of a sub
silentio circuit split, despite no courts identifying such a split in their opinions.
It could be contended that because the requirement of “clear and convincing
reasons” is different from the well-known and demanding standard of proof, “clear
and convincing evidence,”36 the phrase “clear and convincing reasons” should not be
interpreted as adding to an SSA adjudicator’s burden. But drawing this distinction
here seems disingenuous. Though one word changes, the effect is identical: when it
employs this standard, the Ninth Circuit is requiring a higher quantum of justification for the SSA’s decision.
Nonetheless, an argument may be made that the “evidence” of “substantial evidence” and the “reasons” of “clear and convincing reasons” are ships passing in the
night, dissimilar in kind.37 Perhaps one is a standard of review and the other a burden of proof and thus should not be considered to be at odds. This argument is

31

Id.
See Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1231 (9th Cir. 1987) (applying standard to
testimony regarding depression).
33
See Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1015 (9th Cir. 2014); Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d
1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 1996); Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The
Secretary’s reasons for rejecting excess symptom testimony must be clear and convincing if medical
evidence establishes an objective basis for some degree of the symptom and no evidence
affirmatively suggests that the claimant was malingering.”).
34
Search performed Dec. 30, 2019.
35
Id.
36
Clear and convincing evidence—as opposed to reasons—means “evidence that leaves you
with a firm belief or conviction that it is highly probable that the factual contentions of the claim
or defense are true. This is a higher standard of proof than proof by a preponderance of the
evidence, but it does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” NINTH CIRCUIT JURY
INSTRUCTIONS COMM., MANUAL OF MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT
COURTS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT 1.7 (2017) (citing Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316
(1984)).
37
See, e.g., Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1022, 1027 n.9 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Burden of
proof and standard of review are not the same thing.” (citing Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 282
(1966))); Luul Yikalo Tikabo v. United States, No. H-16-2197, 2017 WL 4112306, at *2 (S.D.
Tex. Sept. 18, 2017) (cautioning against “confus[ing] two different concepts: standards of review
and burdens of proof”).
32
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easily rebutted.38 Although the Ninth Circuit’s wording is not “clear and convincing
evidence,” but “clear and convincing reasons,” both words prompt an inquiry into
the qualitative evaluation made by the agency, not a quantitative measuring. Moreover, “substantial evidence” itself is not about merely quantifying disembodied facts
but evaluating the sufficiency of determinations drawn from them.
Evidence is defined as “[t]he available body of facts or information indicating
whether a belief or proposition is true or valid.”39 An evidentiary fact is irrelevant
without the ability to indicate and to support. A “reason” is a “cause, explanation,
or justification for an action or event.”40 A reason can be every bit as fact-based as
evidence. Both evidence and reasons have explanatory relationships to a proposition.
Evidence is simply the raw material for a reason.
The indistinguishable nature of “evidence” and “reason” here is best clarified
by example. In Garrison v. Colvin, the Ninth Circuit reversed the ALJ’s no-disability
determination with direction to enter an award of benefits.41 It did so because “[t]he
ALJ failed to offer specific, clear, and convincing reasons for discrediting Garrison’s
symptom testimony.”42
In reviewing these “reasons,” the court did nothing more than assess the evidence. The first reason the court attributed to the ALJ for discrediting the claimant’s
pain testimony was that “Garrison improved in 2007 and 2008 with the ‘conservative’ treatments of epidural injections and physical therapy.”43 In its rejection of that
reason, the court pointed to evidence that there was “only partial and short-lived
relief of her lower back pain, and no effective relief for her radiating neck pain.”44
As a result, the court concluded there was “no support in the record” for the ALJ’s
discrediting the claimant’s complaints.45 “Support in the record” is the language of
evidence, and evidence, again, is the stuff of reason—at least in the material world.
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit’s “clear and convincing reasons” standard cannot be advocated as something analytically separable from the “substantial evidence”
standard. Both purport to test the quality of the ALJ’s reasoning, and one is facially
more demanding than the other. The Ninth Circuit applies a test intended to be
more stringent than “substantial evidence” to determinations of claimant credibility
and determinations that reject uncontroverted opinions of treating physicians.46

38

In any event, if the standard were “clear and convincing evidence,” that, too, places a
burden on the decision-making process in excess of the statutorily required “substantial evidence.”
39
Evidence, LEXICO, https://www.lexico.com/definition/evidence (last visited Jan. 31, 2020).
40
Reason, LEXICO, https://www.lexico.com/definition/reason (last visited Jan. 31, 2020).
41
Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1013–14 (9th Cir. 2014).
42
Id. at 1014.
43
Id. at 1015.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
See Moore v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 278 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2002).
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II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW, INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE, AND
JUDICIAL ECONOMY
Standards of review inform how appellate courts (including district courts reviewing SSA decisions) look at the decisions or rulings they are reviewing. “The
standard of review focuses on the deference an appellate court affords to the decisions of a district court, jury or agency.”47
The power of a standard of review to alter an outcome is unclear. Professor
Jeffrey Dobbins writes that “the focus of courts, practitioners, and observers on the
standard of review provides strong anecdotal evidence that they make a difference,”48 but also reveals that a change in the standard of review applicable to a particular type of proceeding “does not drive substantially different outcomes with respect to reversal rates.”49 Ultimately, he concludes that “[t]he effect of a standard of
review comes not from the mere power of its words, but from how it affects the way
appellate courts think about their relationship with the entity whose decision is under review.”50
But whether or not we can attach particular reversal rates to the words chosen
to express how a reviewing court should look at the product of the court below, it
would be cynical to claim that the choice of a standard—deferential or not—is irrelevant. The Supreme Court, in Dickinson v. Zurko, devoted pages of the United
States Reports to determining whether the Federal Circuit should apply a “clearly
erroneous” or “substantial evidence” standard to certain lower court findings.51 If
the Court believed these were all mere words rather than words manifesting some
substantive difference, it would hardly have made the effort.52
At one end of the spectrum are standards of review that are not at all deferential.
The well-known “de novo” standard is a non-deferential standard.53 A court applying de novo review does not give weight to the decision below, but comes to its own,
independent conclusions.54
At the other end of the spectrum are highly deferential standards, such as

47

FEDERAL APPELLATE PRACTICE: NINTH CIRCUIT § 18:1 (2018–2019 ed. 2018).
Jeffrey C. Dobbins, Changing Standards of Review, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 205, 228 (2016).
49
Id. at 212.
50
Id.
51
Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 162–63 (1999).
52
See Paul R. Verkuil, supra note 10, at 695 (contending “that the Court takes review
standards seriously”).
53
Lads Trucking Co. v. Bd. of Trustees, 777 F.2d 1371, 1373 (9th Cir. 1985) (“We review
questions of fact under the deferential, clearly erroneous standard, and questions of law under the
non-deferential, de novo standard.”).
54
United States v. First City Nat’l Bank of Houston, 386 U.S. 361, 368 (1967) (holding
that “review de novo” requires “an independent determination of the issues”).
48
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“abuse of discretion” and “clear error.”55 A deferential standard requires a higher
degree of confidence that the decision below was wrong before it should be overturned. “Discretion,” for instance, implies a broad range of acceptable choices.56 A
decisionmaker only abuses its discretion when it acts outside that broad range. A
deferential standard of review recognizes a range of decisional possibilities and does
not require that a particular decision be obtained.
The choice of standard of review typically turns on the characterization of the
issue under review as one resolving a question of law or a question of fact.57 If a
question of law is being reviewed, a non-deferential standard will be applied.58 If,
on the other hand, a question of fact is under review, a reviewing court will typically
be more deferential to the decision below.59 A lower court’s determination of a question of fact, therefore, is less likely to be reversed.
The most common justification for this distinction is that different adjudicative bodies have different institutional competencies.60 Courts of appeals are considered uniquely well-situated to decide legal issues.61 The fact that they have “three
heads” to address a question of logic and reason means they should be given the
independent opportunity to decide what the law is.
Lower adjudicators—be they Article III district courts or administrative courts
like the SSA’s ALJs—are considered to be particularly competent at making factual
determinations.62
The Supreme Court recently took up a case squarely addressing questions of
institutional competence and the division of decisional labor underlying appellate
standards of review.63 In Teva Pharmaceuticals v. Sandoz, a patent case, the Court
55

See, e.g., Lads Trucking Co., 777 F.2d at 1373.
Interpharm, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, 655 F.3d 136, 146 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[D]iscretion
is commonly understood to allow a decision maker to choose from a broad range of choices not
conflicting with law or reason.”).
57
See Kelly Kunsch, Standard of Review (State & Federal): A Primer, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
11, 12 (1994).
58
Lads Trucking Co., 777 F.2d at 1373 (“We review questions of fact under the deferential,
clearly erroneous standard, and questions of law under the non-deferential, de novo standard.”).
59
Id.
60
See Chad M. Oldfather, Appellate Courts, Historical Facts, and the Civil-Criminal
Distinction, 57 VAND. L. REV. 435, 445 (2004) (explaining that “institutional competence is the
dominant consideration” in assigning standards of review).
61
Id. at 435.
62
See Drejka v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 61 F. App’x 778, 781 (3d Cir. 2003) (“It is precisely
because the ALJ is best situated to make credibility determinations that the findings of the ALJ
are given deferential review.”); Robert Anderson IV, Law, Fact, and Discretion in the Federal
Courts: An Empirical Study, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1, 44 (2012) (noting that “the idea that by their
situation or their experience[,] the trial judges find facts better than appellate judges” is a reason
for deferential review).
63
Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S. 318 (2015).
56
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was asked to determine the standard by which the Federal Circuit should review a
district court’s patent claim construction, including the district court’s determination of subsidiary facts.64 The Court held that when the Federal Circuit reviews a
district court’s resolution of subsidiary factual matters made while construing a patent claim, it must apply a “clear error” standard.65 The “clear error” standard is
similar to the “substantial evidence” standard in that (a) it is applied to a lower
body’s fact determinations, and (b) it is a deferential standard.66
In holding that the Federal Circuit must apply a deferential standard, the Court
described some differences between appellate courts and triers of fact: “A district
court judge who has presided over, and listened to, the entirety of a proceeding has
a comparatively greater opportunity to gain that familiarity than an appeals court
judge who must read a written transcript or perhaps just those portions to which
the parties have referred.”67 It noted that the trier of fact “may have to make ‘credibility judgments’ about witnesses.”68
In a parenthetical, the Court further emphasized the different institutional
competencies of the trier of fact and the court of appeals.69 It explained that “Federal
Circuit judges ‘lack the tools that district courts have available to resolve factual
disputes fairly and accurately,’ such as questioning the experts, examining the invention in operation, or appointing a court-appointed expert.”70 The Court concluded this topic with another parenthetical quotation clearly stating the trier of
fact’s primacy: “The trial judge’s major role is the determination of fact, and with
experience in fulfilling that role comes expertise.”71
The classic example of this competence is determination of witness credibil72
ity. Since testimony is taken before triers of fact—they are seeing it in the flesh—
they can make determinations about whether or not to believe a witness that an

64

Id. at 321–22.
Id. at 322.
66
The judicial “clearly erroneous” and agency “substantial evidence” standards are similar,
Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 162–63 (1999), though clear error is “somewhat stricter (i.e.,
allowing somewhat closer judicial review).” Id. at 153.
67
Teva Pharm., 574 U.S. at 838.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 838–39.
70
Id. (quoting Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elec. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272,
1311 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (O’Malley, J., dissenting)).
71
Id. at 839 (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985)).
72
See Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 440 (2001) (employing
the term “institutional competence” in discussing standards of review and noting that when
determining “degree or reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct” for punitive damages
purposes, “district courts have a somewhat superior vantage over courts of appeals, and even then
the advantage exists primarily with respect to issues turning on witness credibility and demeanor”).
65
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appeals court, remote in time and place, cannot.73
But the idea of institutional competence should go beyond an obvious-enough
acknowledgement that the factfinder looked into the eyes of the witness. An institutional trier of fact, such as an ALJ, is faced with voluminous evidentiary material
all the time. The trier of fact weighs competing materials. Should sweat on the brow
discredit the witness, or should documentary evidence overcome that? Is this treating doctor, with his valuable familiarity with a claimant-witness, as experienced as a
consulting expert? There are calls to be made that go beyond how the judge “feels”
about the witnesses before her.
The Supreme Court has explicitly asserted that deference to trier of fact determinations goes beyond deference to simple sight-and-sound assessments.74 Deference must be afforded “even when the district court’s findings do not rest on credibility determinations, but are based instead on physical or documentary evidence or
inferences from other facts.”75 In other words, the trier of fact is the trier of all facts.
The reviewing court is not.
Beyond institutional competence lies another strong justification for deference
to trial-level decisions on factual issues—finality.76 An adjudicative act should not
be in vain; something should be at stake at each level of a proceeding. If reviewing
courts are going to get into the weeds of making first-cut factual determinations,
there is no reason to have those determinations made by lower courts. Adjudication
could begin and end at the appellate courts. Judicial economy requires that there be
a division of labor between trial and appellate bodies. A non-deferential standard of
review discards the work of lower bodies.
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT SHOULD DISCARD ITS MODE OF
CREDIBILITY REVIEW
In the SSA context, the Ninth Circuit’s heightened standard is not only wasteful in its disregard of lower court decisionmaking, it is contrary to Congress’s wishes.
In both the Administrative Procedure Act and the Social Security Act, Congress was
clear about the standard to be applied—the “substantial evidence” standard.77

73

See id.
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985).
75
Id.; see also Dobbins, supra note 48, at 227 (“[S]ome view trial courts to be better than
appellate courts at gathering, assessing, and evaluating facts, even if the trial court’s evidence is
purely documentary.”).
76
See Kunsch, supra note 57, at 19. A recent Supreme Court case suggests another value—
speedy resolution of appeals. Monasky v. Taglieri, 140 S. Ct. 719, 730 (2020) (“As a deferential
standard of review, clear-error review speeds up appeals . . . .”). Presumably, a less searching
inquiry can be performed more quickly.
77
See supra notes 15–16.
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It is, again, difficult to determine the actual effects of standards of review.78
They are verbal formulations subject to interpretation, manipulation, and the differing perspectives of different judges. But to the extent we agree that there is a
reason for differing standards, and that they should lead to different results, it is not
a sufficient response to the Ninth Circuit’s standard to say, “well, that’s just the way
they phrase it.”
The standard has substance. The Ninth Circuit itself has said that its “clear and
convincing” standard “is not an easy requirement to meet: ‘The clear and convincing
standard is the most demanding required in Social Security cases.’”79 Rhetorically,
a greater demand is made on a court asked to apply a “clear and convincing” standard than on one asked to review only for “substantial evidence.”
Ultimately, there is no reason to create a heightened standard of review for
disregarding uncontroverted treating physician testimony. If it is uncontroverted, it
is hard to imagine how its rejection would survive substantial evidence review. This
seems to be an idle use of the language of a heightened standard of review.
There may be policy reasons for requiring heightened scrutiny of claimants’
“excess symptom testimony.”80 It may be, as a policy matter, that the Ninth Circuit
does not want a claimant’s subjective complaints to be disregarded too easily. It may
also believe that ALJs are insufficiently solicitous of claimant symptoms and assertions.
Nonetheless, these determinations are not the Ninth Circuit’s to make. The
standard of review in Social Security matters is provided by statute and requires only
that “substantial evidence” support SSA findings, including credibility findings.81
The Ninth Circuit rule provides a requirement contrary to Congress’s mandate that
is not commonplace judicial gloss. It is the only circuit to import a stricter standard
of review into the Social Security realm, creating a split that should be resolved. This
is made all the more important by the sheer number of SSA appeals heard in the
district and circuit courts.

78

Kunsch, supra note 57, at 12 (“Some courts invoke it talismanically to authenticate the
rest of their opinions. Once they state the standard, they then ignore it throughout their analysis
of the issues. Other courts use standard of review to create an illusion of harmony between the
appropriate result and the applicable law.”).
79
Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1015 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Moore v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec. Admin., 278 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2002)).
80
See Coon, supra note 1, at 190 (“[C]ontinuing to apply the ‘clear and convincing’ standard
will lead to a more efficient, and ultimately more accurate, disability evaluation system.”); see also
id. at 171 (quoting Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1407 (9th Cir. 1986)).
81
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2012).

